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A PROPOSED FORM FOR
LOCAL BOARD CONSIDERATION OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CLAIMS
Nothing contained in this title.., shall be construed to require any person to be subject to ... training and service in
the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection,
the term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.
-Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 66),
50 U.S.C. APP. § 456() (1970)

I. INTRODUCTION
The general subject of selective service reform contains enough
problems to busy the proverbial thousand monkeys at a thousand
typewriters for a thousand years in an effort to solve just one. A
solution to one of these problems, conscientious objection, would
surely justify the effort. But this article, being the work of a single
man using a single typewriter over a period considerably less than
a year, makes no such pretense. Unlike most of the books, articles, and commission reports dealing with the selective service
law, and conscientious objection in particular, this article is concerned primarily with procedural rather than substantive issues. It
is a plea for an administratively imposed requirement that a standard form be used by local boards in considering conscientious
objector claims.'

II.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM AND CLAIMS FOR
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR STATUS

The Selective Service System is a unique administrative organization composed of two parallel branches, each organized on
local, state, and national levels. The professional administrative
I See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of
Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve (1967); and Comment, Successful Evaluation of

Sincerity after Welsh, II

SANTA CLARA

LAW.

381 (1971), for suggestions for more

elaborate legislative reforms which would take the consideration of conscientious objector
claims out of the hands of the local boards.
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branch 2 consists of a director and national headquarters, fifty-six
state directors and headquarters, and clerks at each of the several
thousand local boards.3 The other branch consists of part-time
volunteers who are appointed by the President to the local boards
and state and national appeal boards. 4 The function of these
boards is to classify registrants in accordance with the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967 [hereinafter, 1967 Act] and the
regulations and local board memoranda issued pursuant thereto
5
by the professional arm of the System.
Section 6(j) of the 1967 Act provides for conscientious objector
classification. 6 A registrant may initiate a claim for conscientious
objector status at any time before being ordered to report for
induction. 7 After making his claim to the local board, 8 the registrant is issued Form 150 "Special Form For Conscientious Objector," which requires him to answer various questions concerning the basis for his conscientious objector claim. The answers to these questions together with any other written evidence
added by the registrant to his file, are used by the board in its
consideration of his claim. The registrant also has a right to
appear in person before the local board to give testimony and
present witnesses on his behalf.9
2 The organizational structure of the System is set out in the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Act] §§ 10(a)-(c), 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 460 (a)-(c)
(1970), and regulations issued thereunder, 32 C.F.R. § 1604 (1971). In addition to a
headquarters in each state, there are headquarters in each territory or possession, the
District of Columbia, and New York City.
3 In 1966 there were 4,087 local boards, ranging in size from 27 to 54,000 registrants. J.
DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 33 (1967).
4 1967 Act § 10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 460(b)(3) (1970).
5 Id.
6
1d.§ 60), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 4560) (1970). This section of the Act specifically provides
for two classes of conscientious objectors, those who object to any military service (Class
1-0, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14 (1971)), and those who object only to combatant service (Class
I-A-O, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1971)).
732 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971), as interpreted in Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410,
414- 15 (1970), require the board to "reopen and consider anew the classification of a
registrant ... upon [receipt of] facts not considered when the registrant was classified
which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification." However, after an
induction order has been issued the board may reopen only if "there has been a change in
the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant has no
control." Id. This does not include a conversion to conscientious objection. Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971).
8 The courts have required the boards to take a liberal view of what constitutes a
"claim." See, e.g., United States v. Moyer, 307 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). In Moyer,
the court held that a letter to a draft board from a registrant, explaining that he was
returning his draft card in protest over war and that his act of civil disobedience was based
on moral convictions against killing, sufficiently apprised the local board of the registrant's
claim for conscientious objector classification and was, in effect, a request for a conscientious objector form.
932 C.F.R. § 1624 (1971), as amended 36 Fed. Reg. 21076 (Nov. 3, 1971). The
registrant may exercise this right either before the local board makes a decision on his
claim, or afterwards, in the event of a denial of his claim.

WINTER

1972]

Conscientious Objector Claims

If the registrant is aggrieved by the decision of the local board
he may appeal the decision to the state appeal board, where he
may make a personal appearance and add written evidence to his
file. 10 Should the state appeal board deny his claim by a divided
vote, the registrant may appeal to the national board by right. In
any case, he may request the state or national director to intercede and appeal on his behalf.'1
Thus a registrant has at least three opportumities to present his
claim before it can finally be denied. Furthermore, the 1971
amendments' 2 to the 1967 Act added several procedural
safeguards. These include: (1) the right to appear in person before
the appeal boards; (2) the right to present witnesses before the
local board; (3) the right to demand that a quorum of the local
board be present for any personal appearance; and (4) the right to
"a brief written statement of the reasons for its decision" from the
local board.
Two factors, however, have combined in recent years to make
the present procedure unwieldy. First, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of conscientious objector claims in the last
five years.' 3 Second, the courts have become more active in the
selective service area and have more carefully scrutinized the
decisions of the boards. 14 Furthermore, the courts have broadened the scope of section 60) of the 1967 Act and have established new standards for its application. These standards, discussed throughout the remainder of the article, are equally as
vague as, but more technical than previous standards.
The above developments have adversely affected all parties
involved. The local boards have been required to apply difficult
standards, yet continue to be composed of untrained and unpaid,
albeit often dedicated, personnel who receive limited guidance
from the professional branch of the System. The registrant claiming conscientious objector status is therefore frequently confronted with an uncertain application of these standards and may
be forced to risk criminal prosecution in order to have his claim
resolved. The courts, for their part, remain overburdened with
1032 C.F.R. § 1626 (1971). Until the 1971 amendments to the 1967 Act, the registrant
had no right to appear personally before the state appeal board, but could add written
material to his file indicating the errors of the local board.
11 32 C.F.R. § 1627 (1971), as amended 36 Fed. Reg. 21079 (Nov. 3, 1971).
12 Pub. L. No. 92-129 (Sept. 28, 1971).
13 The number of registrants classified as conscientious objectors increased from 9,031
on June 30, 1966, to 34,000 on June 30, 197 1. Annual Report of the Director of Selective
Service for the Fiscal Year 1966, Selective Service News, Aug. 1971.
14Section 10(b)(3) of the 1967 Act provides that "review shall go to the question of the
jurisdiction herein reserved to the local boards, appeal boards, and the President only
when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant." 50 U.S.C.
App. § 460(b)(3) (1970).
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cases that would never have arisen but for the misapplication of,
or the hopes fostered by, these vague and overly technical standards.
For these reasons entirely new procedures that would place the
determination of conscientious objector claims before a professional body at some stage of the proceeding have been proposed.1 5 Nevertheless, the procedural changes in recent years
have been limited to the abolition of Justice Department hearings
at the appeal board level in 1967,16 and the procedural rights
implemented in 1971. This article presents a new approach designed to alleviate some of the problems within the present system
through administratively imposed measures. The approach, stated
most simply, is to inform the local board of the issues it must
decide when considering a conscientious objector claim, to clarify
what criteria the board must consider in deciding each issue, and
to require the board to give adequate reasons for its final deci17
sion.
III.

THE PROPOSAL

The proposed form"' is designed to meet many of the objections to current Selective Service procedures. In general, it breaks
down the conscientious objector provision of the 1967 Act, section 6(j), 19 into three tests: (1)whether the objection is based
upon "religious training and belief"; (2) whether the objection
extends to20"war in any form"; and (3) whether the objector is
"sincere."
Each of these tests must be met if the claim is to be
15 See note I supra, and Donahue, The Supreme Court vs. Section 1O(b)(3) of the
Selective Service Act:A Study in Ducking Constitutional Issues, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 893
(1970).

1650 U.S.C. APP. § 462(c) (1970).
17 Itshould be noted that the local boards are not without any guidance in the area at-the

present time. Local Board Memorandum No. 107, issued by the Director of Selective
Service on July 6, 1970, does attempt to set forth the criteria that should be considered by
the local board in deciding a conscientious objector claim. However. the proposal embodied in this article goes beyond Memorandum 107 in several respects. It attempts to
present the criteria in considerably more detail, especially in the area of sincerity, the
single most important issue presented in most conscientious objector cases. Cf. United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965): "[Sincerity is] the threshold question ...
which must be resolved in every case." In the case of conscientious objectors, the criteria
are complicated enough so that they should be directly before the board each time a claim
is considered.
18 Section I0(b)(I) of the 1967 Act gives the President the authority "to prescribe the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this [Act]", 50 U.S.C. App. §
460(b)(I) (1970), and this authority has been delegated to the Director of the Selective
Service System under the authority of section 10(c) of the 1967 Act, id. § 460(c). Thus the
Director has the power to require that local boards use the proposed form.
19 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1970).
20
This three part analysis was recently approved by the Supreme Court in Clay v.
United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). See also Local Board Memorandum No. 197 (July 6,
1970).
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upheld by the local board. The criteria which the board should
consider in applying the tests are set forth in the proposed form,
and the board must, on the same form, make a decision as to
whether each test is met and give the reasons for its decision. 2 1
The proposed form is set forth below. Each section is followed
by a comment which seeks to justify the criteria advanced in the
section and to discuss the development of the substantive law of
22
conscientious objection.
FORM FOR LOCAL BOARD USE
IN CONSIDERATION OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CLAIMS
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
ALL LOCAL BOARDS MUST USE THE FORM IN
CONSIDERING CLAIMS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR STATUS. THE BOARD MUST CONSIDER
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS IN EVERY
CASE, AND THE FINDING IN EACH SECTION
MUST BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE CRITERIA
PRESENTED IN THE SECTION AND THE FACTS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL CASE. A CLAIM SHALL BE DENIED IN THE EVENT OF AN ADVERSE FINDING,
INCLUDING A FINDING OF INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION, IN ONE OR MORE SECTIONS. THE
CLAIM SHALL BE GRANTED ONLY UPON A FIND21 Two recent developments should make the adoption of this procedure attractive to the
Selective Service System. The first is the reform instituted by the 1971 amendments to the
1967 Act that require the local board, on demand, to give the registrant reasons for its
classification decision. Pub. L. No. 92-129 § 22(b)(4) (1971). This seems designed to make
the registrant's appeal rights more meaningful and gives legislative approval to a requirement already imposed by several courts. See, e.g., United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d
736 (9th Cir. 1969), holding that the local board must give reasons for denial if the
registrant makes out a "prima facie" case. Contra, Gruca v. Secretary of the Army, 436
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971), wherein the court held that
the board need not give reasons where enough evidence appeared in the record to support
a finding of insincerity.
The second important development was the Supreme Court's decision in Clay v. United
States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). As indicated above, the 1971 amendments require the local
board to give reasons for its denial of a claim; Clay seems to indicate that the reasons
given must all be legally valid. This is an exemplary rule where the statement of reasons
leaves open the strong possibility that the erroneous reason may have tainted all the other
reasons given. In an earlier application of the same rule, however, the Supreme Court
limited its application to situations "where it is not clear that the board relied on some
legitimate ground." Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 392 (1955). Thus, even if it
were not required by the 1967 Act, the more detailed reasons on the proposed form might
well save a classification decision in which there were one or more erroneous decisions
against the registrant along with at least one valid finding against him.
22
The substantive law dealing with the issue of a registrant's sincerity in a conscientious
objector claim has been virtually ignored in past writings, even though it is likely to
become the dominant issue in future cases.
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ING IN FAVOR OF THE REGISTRANT IN ALL SECTIONS.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS FORM IS TO PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR EVALUATING THE LOCAL BOARD DECISION TO THE REGISTRANT, AND ANY ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL OR EXECUTIVE BODY REVIEWING THE CLAIM. FOR THIS REASON, CARE
SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN SUPPORTING THE
FINDINGS IN EACH SECTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CRITERIA SET FORTH THEREIN.
EACH TIME A CLAIM IS CONSIDERED BY THE
BOARD, A SEPARATE FORM MUST BE USED AND,
IF NECESSARY, SEPARATE FINDINGS MADE.
Comment
This section is designed to acquaint the local board with the
purpose of the form and the procedure to be followed in its use.
As provided in the first paragraph, the board must consider all
sections of the' form in each case, rather than merely stopping
with the first adverse finding.
This section also requires that a separate form be used each
time that a claim is considered by the local board. Thus, one form
will be used by the board in its initial consideration of the claim,
and, if the claim is denied and the registrant makes a personal
23
appearance before the board, a second form will then be used.
Since it is entirely possible that the personal appearance will
change none of the board's initial conclusions, separate findings
are to be made only "if necessary."
SECTION 2. RELIGIOUS
TRAINING AND BELIEF
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR STATUS, THE REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION MUST BE BASED UPON RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
STATUS IS NOT LIMITED TO MEMBERS OF
SO-CALLED "PEACE-CHURCHES," NOR IS IT LIMITED TO THOSE PERSONS WHOSE BELIEFS ARE
RELIGIOUS IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. THE
REGISTRANT NEED NOT BELIEVE IN A TRADI23

The board must make findings when it initially considers the claim, because the
registrant is not required to make a personal appearance before appealing the local board
decision. 32 C.F.R. § 1623.1 (1971).
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TIONAL "GOD" OR A "SUPREME BEING." IF A
REGISTRANT CLASSIFIES HIS BELIEFS AS RELIGIOUS, THE LOCAL BOARD SHOULD GIVE GREAT
WEIGHT TO THIS STATEMENT. EVEN IF THE REGISTRANT DOES NOT CATAGORIZE HIS BELIEFS
AS RELIGIOUS, OR SPECIFICALLY DENIES THAT
THEY ARE RELIGIOUS, THE LOCAL BOARD MUST
MAKE AN INDEPENDENT FINDING ON THE ISSUE BASED UPON THE CRITERIA WHICH FOLLOW.
THE LOCAL BOARD SHALL FIND THAT THE
REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION IS BASED UPON RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF, ONLY IF THE BELIEFS STATED IMPOSE UPON THE REGISTRANT A
DUTY OF CONSCIENCE TO REFRAIN FROM PARTICIPATION IN WAR. THESE BELIEFS MAY BE
THOSE THAT WOULD ORDINARILY BE CATAGORIZED AS MORAL OR ETHICAL AS WELL AS RELIGIOUS. THE LOCAL BOARD IS NOT FREE TO REJECT PROFESSED BELIEFS BECAUSE THEY APPEAR INCOMPREHENSIBLE OR SIMPLY INCORRECT. NOR IS IT PROPER TO CONSIDER HERE
THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, SUCH AS SINCERITY.
THE FACT THAT THE REGISTRANT'S BELIEFS
MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OR OTHER FACTORS IS
NOT A GROUND FOR AN ADVERSE FINDING UNDER THIS SECTION, SO LONG AS THE BELIEFS
ARE IN FACT MORAL, ETHICAL, OR RELIGIOUS
IN CHARACTER. SIMILARLY, THE FACT THAT A
REGISTRANT'S BELIEFS ARE NOT A PRODUCT OF
ANY SYSTEMATIC RELIGIOUS, MORAL OR ETHICAL TRAINING, BUT MERELY THE RESULT OF
THE REGISTRANT'S OWN CONTEMPLATION,
STUDY, OR INTERPRETATION IS NOT A GROUND
FOR AN ADVERSE FINDING UNDER THIS SECTION.
THE LOCAL BOARD SHALL FIND THAT THE
REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION IS NOT BASED UPON
RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF IF THE
BOARD FINDS, WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORT IN
THE REGISTRANT'S FILE, THAT HIS BELIEFS ARE
BASED SOLELY UPON CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY, PRAGMATISM, OR EXPEDIENCY. THUS IF
THE REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION IS BASED SOLELY UPON DISAGREEMENT WITH THE FOREIGN
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POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WITH THE
EFFICIENCY OF WARFARE AS A MEANS OF
ACHIEVING SOCIAL ENDS, SUFFICIENT
GROUNDS FOR AN ADVERSE FINDING UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL EXIST. THESE GROUNDS
ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE EXHAUSTIVE. THE
PRINCIPAL QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED BY
THE LOCAL BOARD IS WHETHER THE REGISTRANT'S BELIEFS, AS STATED, IMPOSE UPON HIM
A DUTY OF CONSCIENCE TO REFRAIN FROM
PARTICIPATION IN WAR.
IN ITS INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE REGISTRANT'S CLAIM, THE LOCAL BOARD MAY FIND
THAT THE REGISTRANT HAS NOT PRESENTED
SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PERMIT A DISPOSITIVE FINDING UNDER THIS SECTION. ORDINARILY SUCH A FINDING WILL ONLY BE APPROPRIATE WHEN THE REGISTRANT HAS MERELY
STATED THAT HIS OBJECTION IS RELIGIOUS
WITHOUT PROVIDING ANY FURTHER DETAILS.
THE REGISTRANT AGAINST WHOM SUCH A
FINDING IS MADE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO
SUPPLY FURTHER INFORMATION AT ANY PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND ONLY IN THE EVENT
THAT HE FAILS TO DO SO, OR FAILS TO MAKE A
PERSONAL APPEARANCE, SHOULD THIS FINDING BE FINAL AT THE LOCAL BOARD LEVEL.
FINDINGS
-THE LOCAL BOARD FINDS THAT THE REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION IS BASED UPON RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF.
2.-FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS, THE LOCAL BOARD FINDS THAT THE REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION IS BASED SOLELY
UPON CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY, PRAGMATISM, OR EXPEDIENCY:
I.

3.-FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS, THE LOCAL BOARD FINDS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THIS QUESTION:
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Comment

Section 6(j) of the 1967 Act requires that conscientious objection be "by reason of religious training and belief." The criteria in
this section of the proposed form are based upon the interpretation of this phrase by the Supreme Court in a long line of
cases.
While conscientious objection has long been recognized in this
country, until relatively recent times it was generally limited to
members of a few specific sects, like the Quakers, which were
doctrinally opposed to participating in war. 24 Until World War I,
however, others could escape from military service by providing a
substitute or paying a fee. 25 The Selective Draft Act of 191728 for

27
the first time provided for mandatory service in the military.
Although on its face the 1917 statute continued the practice of
limiting conscientious objector status to members of wellrecognized pacifist sects, in practice the executive branch extended the same consideration to all persons who claimed, upon in28
duction, to be conscientious objectors.

The Selective Training and Service Act of 194029 adopted a
quite different approach, for the limitation to particular sects was
entirely abandoned in favor of the more general provision which
appears virtually unaltered in section 60) of the 1967 Act. 30 The
31
1940 statute expanded the criteria for conscientious objection,
but the exact scope of that expansion has been the subject of
considerable debate by the courts. Between the enactment of the
provision in 1940 and a 1948 revision, two important, and
24 See generally, Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the

United States, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Russell]; Conklin,
Conscientious Objector Provisions:A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 Geo. L.
J. 252 (1963); and Selective Service Monograph No. I1 (1950). Russell points out,
however, that the Rhode Island Act of August 13, 1673, perhaps the first colonial
recognition of conscientious objection, and the Pennsylvania Act of November 25, 1775,
were not clearly limited even to religious objectors. Russell at 413.
2 Russell, supra note 24, at 412-20.
26 Ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
27The constitutionality of the conscientious objector provisions of this Act were upheld
in 28
a dictum in The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
Exec. Order No. 2823 (1918). It should be noted that this "consideration" was only
noncombatant service. There was no alternative service option available for those who
opposed all military activity.
2 Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
3
0The only change is the addition of the phrase specifically excluding "political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" in the 1967 Act. 50
U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1970).
31 The 1940 statute appears to have been the result of some successful lobbying by
pacifist groups. Russell, supra note 24, at 423.
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conflicting, decisions interpreting the phrase "religious training
and belief" were decided by the United States courts of appeals.
In United States v. Kauten,3 2 the Second Circuit established a
liberal interpretation of the phrase: "It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer
to disregard elementary self interest and to accept martyrdom in
preference to transgressing its tenets." 3 3 On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit was more theistically oriented, holding in Berman v.
United States3 4 that by "religious training and belief" Congress
meant "[f]aith in a supreme power above and beyond the law of
all creation .... "
Faced with these diverse interpretations of the 1940 statute,
Congress defined "religious training and belief" in the 1948 revision as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 3 5 This phrase
was derived from the dissent of Chief Justice Hughes in United
States v. Macintosh,3 6 which was cited by the Berman Court with
approval, but modified by substituting "Supreme Being" in the
Act for "God" in the Hughes opinion. In addition, the Berman
37
case was cited in the Senate report on the 1948 revision.
Although this would seem to indicate that Congress intended to
adopt Berman's theistic definition of "religious training and be38
lief," the Supreme Court disagreed. In United States v. Seeger,
the Court undertook a rather tortuous interpretation of legislative
history in order to hold that section 6(j) is satisfied if "a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of
its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." 3 9 This interpretation
40
was clearly strained if not totally implausible.
Nevertheless, in 1970 this test was broadened in Welsh v.
32 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).

33 Id. at 708.
34 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946). Interestingly, it appears quite likely that neither
Kauten's nor Berman's beliefs would qualify even under the Welsh test. See notes 41, 42,
43, and 44 .upra, and accompanying text.
3562 Stat. 613 (1948). In section 6(j) of the 1967 Act, Congress excluded the phrase
defining religious training and belief, but retained the "does not include.
phrase. 50
U.S.C. APP. § 4560) (1970).
36283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
37S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong. 2d Sess., 14 (1948).
38380 U.S. 163 (1965).
39
40

Id. at 166.

Cf. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351
(1970).
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United States.4 1 Mr. Justice Black's plurality opinion in Welsh
once again purported to rest the expansion of section 6(j) on
statutory construction. According to the opinion, section 60) "exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred
by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an
instrument of war."' 42 The only individuals excluded from this
definition of religious training and belief are those "whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, religious or ethical
principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy,
43
pragmatism or expediency."
This historical background should provide a basis for discussing the criteria advanced in the "Religious Training and Belief' section of the proposed form. These criteria are primarily
aimed at reflecting the Welsh definition of religious training and
belief. Because of the breadth of that definition, very few claims
will be disqualified under this section, and the difficulty will be to
convey to the local board the scope of the Welsh definition, while
at the same time defining the small number of claims that may still
not meet this test.
United States v. Shevenel 44 is a case which indicates that as
late as 1969 at least one local board thought that conscientious
objector status was limited to members of the "peace churches."
The first paragraph of this section of the proposed form is de4'

398 U.S. 333 (1970).

42

Id. at 344.

43 Id.

at 342 (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Harlan felt that by reading section 6() so
broadly, Justice Black had "performed a lobotomy and completely transformed the statute;" yet he concurred in the judgment and the test advanced, although basing his
concurrence on constitutional grounds. Id. at 35 I.
It should be noted that Welsh dealt with the 1948 version of section 60) just as Seeger
did. The language was amended in the 1967 Act, and, although the deletion of the phrase
purporting to define religious training and belief might be thought to evince an intent to
limit the section, the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 31 (1967),
makes it clear that somehow the change was intended to limit the scope of section 6(j).
This argument has been unpersuasive to the lower courts however, who have uniformly
applied the Welsh standard. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 431 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir.
1970).
The Welsh decision, like the Seeger decision, is difficult to analyze because the plurality
opinion may not state the true reasoning of the Court. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Welsh is helpful, for it may indicate that the Court was merely trying to avoid a difficult
constitutional issue in both cases. The dissent points out, 398 U.S. at 368, the conceptual
difficulty in remedying a constitutionally defective statute by in effect amending the statute
as Justice Harlan does. One can probably assume that underlying both the Black and
Harlan opinions were the traditional recognition of conscientious objection in this country
and the changing nature of our society from religious to secular. The constitutional
infirmity for Justice Harlan was that the distinction between theistic and non-theistic
beliefs violated the establishment clause, since it was underinclusive of the class of
conscientious objectors.
44 3 10 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Me. 1970).
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signed to correct this, and make it clear to the local boards that
they should not apply exclusively traditional standards of religious
training and belief.
The second paragraph attempts to set out the Welsh holding as
clearly as possible. 45 Additionally, in light of the phrase "religious
training" it must be made clear to the local boards that the 1967
Act "does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs." '4 6 A registrant need not have attended divinity
school to qualify for conscientious objector status.
The third paragraph attempts to illustrate those beliefs which
still do not qualify under the Welsh test. The Welsh Court's test
did seem to exclude those who are motivated solely by the type of
purely pragmatic belief, such as the inefficiency of war, illustrated
in Berman.
The fourth paragraph is necessary to prevent registrants from
satisfying this section merely by stating that their objection is
based on religious training and belief. Finally the "insufficient
information" finding may be open to abuse-thus the attempt to
limit it to a preliminary finding. However, a local board may use
this finding to avoid careful examination of the merits or to require the registrant to make a personal appearance. While such
practices should be discouraged, they seem inevitable.
SECTION 3. WAR IN ANY FORM
IN ORDER TO BE CLASSIFIED AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, THE REGISTRANT MUST
BE OPPOSED TO WAR IN ANY FORM. A REGISTRANT WHOSE OBJECTION EXTENDS ONLY TO A
PARTICULAR WAR, OR CLASS OF WARS, IS INELIGIBLE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR STATUS. NEVERTHELESS, A REGISTRANT WHOSE BELIEFS WOULD ALLOW HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN A
CERTAIN TYPE OF WAR MAY NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THIS SECTION IF THE CLASS
OF WARFARE TO WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT
WOULD NOT FORESEEABLY OCCUR IN THE
PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD. THUS, IT IS NOT
A GROUND FOR AN ADVERSE FINDING UNDER
THIS SECTION THAT A REGISTRANT WOULD
4 This paragraph does not differ greatly from the Selective Service System's interpretation in Local Board Memorandum No. 107 (1970), but goes to greater length to
guarantee that the broad scope of that holding is emphasized.
46 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965).
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PARTICIPATE IN A WAR UNDER THE COMMAND
OF GOD. SIMILARLY, A REGISTRANT WHO BELIEVES IN THE THEORY OF A "JUST WAR" IN
WHICH HE WOULD PARTICIPATE, BUT DOES NOT
BELIEVE THAT SUCH A WAR COULD POSSIBLY
OCCUR IN THE MODERN WORLD, WOULD NOT BE
DISQUALIFIED UNDER THIS SECTION.
THE TERM "WAR" IS USED IN ITS LITERAL
SENSE. IT IS NOT PROPER TO REJECT A CLAIM
UNDER THIS SECTION IF A REGISTRANT INDICATES THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR HIS FAMILY OR OTHERS
FROM IMMEDIATE ATTACK. MOREOVER, THE BELIEFS AT ISSUE ARE THE REGISTRANT'S CURRENT BELIEFS, AND A CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE
DENIED MERELY BECAUSE A REGISTRANT IS
UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PREDICT HIS BELIEFS AT SOME FUTURE DATE UNDER UNFORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN MAKING A DETERMINATION UNDER THIS SECTION, HOWEVER,
THE LOCAL BOARD MAY PROPERLY SEEK THE
REACTION OF THE REGISTRANT TO REASONABLY FORESEEABLE FACT SITUATIONS.
IN THE EVENT OF AN ADVERSE FINDING UNDER THIS SECTION, THE LOCAL BOARD SHALL
NOTE THE REASONS FOR ITS DECISION, AS SUPPORTED BY THE REGISTRANT'S FILE.
IN ITS INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE
CLAIM, THE BOARD MAY FIND THAT THE REGISTRANT HAS NOT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ENABLE THE BOARD TO MAKE A
DISPOSITIVE FINDING ON THIS ISSUE. IN THAT
EVENT, THE LACK OF INFORMATION SHALL BE
NOTED. THE REGISTRANT SHOULD THEN BE ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION AT ANY PERSONAL APPEARANCE,
AND ONLY IF HE FAILS TO DO SO, OR FAILS TO
MAKE A PERSONAL APPEARANCE, SHOULD THIS
BE THE FINAL ACTION AT THE LOCAL BOARD
LEVEL.
FINDINGS
LOCAL BOARD FINDS THAT THE REGISTRANT'S OBJECTION EXTENDS TO WAR
IN ANY FORM.
2.-FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS, THE LOI.-THE
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CAL BOARD FINDS THAT THE REGISTRANT
IS NOT OPPOSED TO WAR IN ANY FORM:

.-

FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS, THE LOCAL BOARD FINDS INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THIS QUESTION:

Comment
Section 6(j) of the 1967 Act provides that in order to obtain
conscientious objector status a registrant must be "opposed to
participation in war in any form." The "war in any form" limitation upon conscientious objection first appeared in the 1917 statute 47 and was intended to exclude from conscientious objector
status those whose opposition extended only to World War I.
There was an attempt in Congress to adopt a broader definition
that would include those opposed only to that war, but the attempt failed.' 8 In 1940 this provision was carried over into the
new enactment without objection, 49 and remains in the 1967 Act.
An understanding of the judicial reaction to the problem of
selective objection requires a close examination of four decisions
handed down over a period of forty years which form the outstanding links in a chain of judicial reasoning leading to Gillette v.
United States.5 0 In the first of these decisions, Macintosh v.
United States,5 ' the Supreme Court held that a selective objector
was properly denied citizenship under the naturalization laws.
Nonetheless, the dissent of Chief Justice Hughes, joined by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, is far more important for our
purposes? 2 It is widely quoted with approval in selective service
47 See generally, Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objections: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REV. 1355 (1968); and Redlich & Feinberg, Individual Conscience
and the Selective Conscientious Objector: The Right Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875
(1969).
48 55 CONG. REC. 1474 (1917). The amendment appears to have been aimed at allowing

those of German or Austrian descent to avoid combat service. There seems to have been
no conception of a religious selective objector.
49 Russell, supra note 24, at 423.
50401 U.S. 439 (1971). United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), presents for comparison the contrary holding, that
exemption of selective objectors is constitutionally mandated.
51
5 2 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
1 Macintosh was overruled in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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decisions, and, as noted above, 53 was the basis for the language in
the 1948 revision defining religious training and belief.
The dissent in Macintosh defended conscientious objection as a
part of our religious freedoms and contended that the statute in
question should be interpreted with this history in mind. Furthermore, the dissenters said, Macintosh's beliefs cannot be distinguished from other conscientious objectors "because his conscientious scruples have particular reference to wars believed to
be unjust. There is really nothing new in such an attitude." 54 The
dissenters viewed selective objection as primarily motivated by
religion or conscience and saw no reason to distinguish it from
general objection. 5 5 On the other hand, the question in Macintosh
involved construction of a naturalization law, not a military procurement act, and the statute did not contain the "war in any
form" language of the selective service statute then in effect.
Nevertheless, the Macintosh dissent does throw light upon judicial attitudes toward conscientious and selective objection.
56
The second case to be considered is United States v. Kauten,
decided by the Second Circuit in 1943. The court in that case
adopted a distinctly liberal interpretation of religious training and
belief. At the same time, however, it took a narrow view of the
phrase "war in any form," stating that selective objection "is
usually a political objection, while [general objection], we think,
may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an
inward mentor .... -57 Here the court was interpreting a specific
provision limiting the scope of the conscientious objection exemption; but surely a court that could interpret religious training
and belief as broadly as the Kauten court did would not be
restrained by that fact. The crucial factor may well have been the
court's concern for national security. The case arose during World
War II, and the court had just advanced a broad definition of
religious training and belief. The court seems to be using the "war
in any form" provision to ensure that the number of conscientious
objectors would be small and national security would not be
impaired.
The third important case is Sicurella v. United States, 58 decided by the Supreme Court in 1955, and holding that the phrase
53Note 36 supra.
4 283 U.S. at 635.
55,[T]o engage in a war believed to be unjust would be contrary to the tenets of
religious groups among our citizens who are of patriotic purpose and exemplary conduct."
Id. at 632.
56 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
57Id. at 708.
58348 U.S. 385 (1955).
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"war in any form" was not intended by Congress to exclude a
registrant who was only willing to take part in a theocratic war
commanded by Jehovah: "Congress had in mind real shooting
wars when it referred to war in any form-actual military conflicts
between nations of the earth in our time-wars with bombs and
bullets, tanks, planes, and rockets." 5 9 As in Macintosh, the case
arose in peace time, and no danger was posed to the national
defense by allowing Sicurella's claim. Declining to follow a literal
construction of a fairly clear congressional prohibition, the Court
recognized what the Kauten court denied-that there is a religious
basis for selective objection, however limited it may have been in
Sicurella's case.
The recent Gillette case 60 is a shift in emphasis from Sicurella.
The Gillette Court held that the "plain words" of section 6(j) (this
from the same court that decided Welsh) excluded from conscientious objector status "persons who object solely to a particular war," 6 1 even if their beliefs come within the definition of
"religious training and belief." The Court further held that this
statutory discrimination did not violate either the free exercise or
establishment clauses of the first amendment, since "the
affirmative purposes underlying section 60) are neutral and secular," and any "incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioner's
position are strictly justified by substantial government interests
that relate directly to the very impacts questioned." 6 2 Both Gillette and Kauten arose in time of war, and both courts had already
accepted a very broad definition of the phrase "religious training
and belief." Therefore, the specter of national security arose again
63
in Gillette.
The merits and rationale of Gillette are not, however, the
primary concerns of the proposed form; rather, the task is to set
out the rule of the case for the local board. The criteria advanced
in the "War In Any Form" section of the proposed form attempt
to do just that.
Two exceptions to the general rule against selective objection
appear in the first paragraph of the section. The first & these is
the theocratic war exception of Sicurella. The second is an ex59
60

Id. at 391.
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).

at 447-48.
Id. at 462.
63 There is a major difference between Gillette and Kauten, however. Since Sicurella the
Court cannot pretend that the war in any form limitation will not exclude some truly
religious objectors. One suspects that, that being the case, it was the order in which the
Welsh and Gillette cases arose, rather than their individual merits, which determined their
respective outcomes.
61 Id.
62

WINTER

1972]

Conscientious Objector Claims

ception for a registrant who, while accepting the theory of a just
war, does not believe such a war is possible in today's world. The
Sicurella rationale seems equally applicable in this second case.
So long as the registrant's objection extends to any foreseeable
war "between nations of the earth in our time," the national
security considerations in Kauten and Gillette do not apply.
The second paragraph of the section further limits the general
prohibition of selective objection. These are approved and distinguished by the Court in Gillette. Acting in self defense against
an immediate attack is hardly participation in war. The Gillette
Court also points out that beliefs are subject to change, and that it
would be unjust to inquire into more than current beliefs. In order
that this idea should not be misunderstood, however, the section
specifically allows the local board to use hypothetical questions
during a personal appearance. Practically, this appears to be the
only way to question the registrant as to this part of his claim,
even though it allows the abuses apparent in the "what would you
do if your grandmother was being raped" hypothetical.
SECTION 4. SINCERITY
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTOR STATUS, THE BELIEFS-UPON WHICH A
REGISTRANT BASES HIS CLAIM MUST BE DEEPLY
AND SINCERELY HELD. IF THE LOCAL BOARD
DETERMINES THAT THE REGISTRANT IS NOT
SINCERE IN HIS PROFESSED BELIEFS, THEN IT
MUST DENY THE CLAIM. HOWEVER THE MERE
FACT THAT A LOCAL BOARD DOES NOT BELIEVE
THAT A REGISTRANT IS SINCERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN ADVERSE FINDING. THE
DETERMINATION OF THIS ISSUE IS TO BE MADE
UPON THE LOCAL BOARD'S CONSIDERATION OF
ALL THE VARIOUS ITEMS OF OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE REGISTRANT'S 'FILE
OR TESTIMONY.
THE LOCAL BOARD MAY PROPERLY CONSIDER
THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:
(1) CONFLICTING OR INCONSISTENT INFORMATION: THE FACT THAT THE REGISTRANT'S CLAIM INCLUDES SUCH INFORMATION ON ITS FACE MAY BE CONSIDERED EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY.
(2) DEMEANOR AND CREDIBILITY: IF THE
REGISTRANT APPEARS BEFORE THE LO-
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CAL BOARD THESE FACTORS MAY BE
CONSIDERED. A FORTHRIGHT MANNER
MAY BE EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY, WHILE
EVASIVENESS, INABILITY TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS OR TO EXPLAIN INCONSISTENT OR CONFLICTING INSINCERITY. THE LOCAL BOARD SHOULD
RECORD IN DETAIL THE PARTICULAR
POINTS IN THE REGISTRANT'S TESTIMONY UPON WHICH IT BASES ITS FINDINGS. THE FACT THAT A REGISTRANT IS
POORLY EDUCATED AND HAS DIFFICULTY ARTICULATING HIS CLAIM IS
NOT EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY, NOR IS
POLISHED SPEECH EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY.
(3) EMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES: PREVIOUS OR CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OR
ACTIVITY MAY BEAR UPON SINCERITY.
HUMANITARIAN OR RELIGIOUS EMPLOYMENT OR ACTIVITY OR PEACEFUL PROTEST AGAINST WAR MAY BE EVIDENCE
OF SINCERITY. EMPLOYMENT OR ACTIVITIES IN MILITARY AREAS, SUCH AS DEFENSE WORK OR RESERVE OFFICER
TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) MAY BE EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY.
(4) REFERENCES: LETTERS SUBMITTED BY
THE REGISTRANT OR INDIVIDUALS PERSONALLY CONTACTED BY THE BOARD
MAY FURNISH PERTINENT INFORMATION.
ORDINARILY, GREAT
WEIGHT SHOULD ONLY BE GIVEN TO
PERSONAL EVALUATIONS RECEIVED
FROM SOURCES WELL ACQUAINTED
WITH THE REGISTRANT.
(5) TIMING: THE FACT THAT A CLAIM IS
FILED CLOSE TO THE DATE OF INDUCTION MAY BE EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY BUT IT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.
THIS FACTOR MAY HAVE NO RELEVANCE
AT ALL IF THE REGISTRANT HAS AT ALL
TIMES BEEN IN A LOWER SELECTION
GROUP AND THUS NOT REQUIRED TO
FILE HIS CLAIM, OR IF THE LOCAL
BOARD FINDS THAT THE FILING OF THE
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CLAIM ACCOMPANIED A CHANGE OR
CRYSTALLIZATION OF BELIEF.
(6) EXPRESSION OF BELIEFS: A RECORD OF
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EXPRESSION OF HIS
BELIEFS MAY BE EVIDENCE OF THE REGISTRANT'S SINCERITY. RECENT EXPRESSION OF INCONSISTENT OR CONFLICTING BELIEFS MAY BE EVIDENCE OF
INSINCERITY. THE MERE FACT THAT A
REGISTRANT HAS NOT GIVEN PUBLIC
EXPRESSION TO HIS BELIEFS IS NOT NECESSARILY EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY.
(7) RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: AFFILIATION
WITH A PARTICULAR SECT, WHICH
HOLDS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS
ONE OF ITS BELIEFS, IS RELEVANT TO
THE ISSUE OF SINCERITY, BUT IS NOT
DISPOSITIVE. THE PERSONAL BELIEF OF
THE REGISTRANT, AND NOT THE TENETS
OF HIS RELIGION, IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. LACK OF MEMBERSHIP IN ANY SECT
IS NOT EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY, NOR
IS THE FACT THAT THE REGISTRANT IS
NOT AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A SECT
WHOSE BELIEFS HE MAY FOLLOW. IT
MAY BE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE THAT
THE REGISTRANT IS NOT CONSIDERED A
MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING OF A SECT
TO WHICH HE MAY CLAIM MEMBERSHIP,
BUT THE FACT THAT HE MAY REJECT
SOME OF THE TENETS OF SUCH SECT OR
THAT THE BOARD MAY NOT AGREE WITH
HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECT'S TENETS IS IRRELEVANT.
(8) DRASTIC CHANGE IN BEHAVIOR: THIS
MAY BE EVIDENCE OF THE' INSINCERITY
OF A REGISTRANT WHO CLAIMS LONG
ADHERENCE TO THE BELIEFS ON WHICH
HE BASES HIS CLAIM, BUT WHO, FOR EXAMPLE, SUDDENLY INCREASES HIS RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR AFTER FILING HIS CLAIM. ON
THE OTHER HAND, THE SAME FACTS
MAY BE EVIDENCE OF THE SINCERITY
OF ONE WHO CLAIMS A RECENT CHANGE
IN BELIEF.

[VOL. 5:2

Journal of Law Reform

(9) PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD: THIS MAY BE
EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY WHERE IT
INCLUDES ACTIONS THAT INDICATE A
DISRESPECT FOR LIFE, OR ACTIONS
OTHERWISE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS
CLAIM. A PRIOR RECORD WHICH DOES
NOT INCLUDE SUCH CRIMES IS IRRELEVANT.
(10) PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: LOCAL BOARD
MEMBERS MAY RELY UPON THEIR OWN
KNOWLEDGE OF THE REGISTRANT. IF
SUCH INFORMATION IS RELIED UPON IT
MUST BE PLACED IN THE REGISTRANT'S
FILE.
OTHER FACTORS MAY BE CONSIDERED BY THE
LOCAL BOARD AS THE FACTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE WARRANT. FACTORS CONSIDERED SHOULD BE RELEVANT AND EITHER CONSISTENT OR INCONSISTENT WITH THE REGISTRANT'S CLAIM. CONTRADICTORY OR INCONSISTENT INFORMATION SHOULD BE
BROUGHT TO THE REGISTRANT'S ATTENTION IF
HE APPEARS BEFORE THE'LOCAL BOARD, AND
HE SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPLAIN SUCH INFORMATION. IN MAKING ITS
DETERMINATION, THE LOCAL BOARD SHOULD
SET OUT ALL OF THE FACTORS WHICH IT FINDS
WEIGH FOR AND/OR AGAINST THE REGISTRANT'S CLAIM. THE BOARD'S CONCLUSION
SHOULD BE BASED UPON A WEIGHING OF
THOSE FACTORS.
FINDINGS
1. FACTORS INDICATING
TRANT IS SINCERE:

THAT

THE

REGIS-

2. FACTORS INDICATING
TRANT IS INSINCERE:

THAT

THE

REGIS-

3. BASED UPON THESE FACTORS, THE LOCAL
BOARD FINDS THAT THE REGISTRANT IS
IN HIS CLAIM.
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Comment
Section 6(j) of the 1967 Act does not specifically mention
sincerity as a requirement for conscientious objector status. Nevertheless, such a requirement seems implicit in the very concept
of conscientious objection, and the Supreme Court, in Witmer v.
United States,64 has said that "the ultimate question in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of the registrant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form."
Sincerity is surely the most difficult of the requirements to deal
with under the procedure suggested in this article. The nature of
the issue is such that no single court decision, or series of decisions, can set universal guidelines. Indeed, the term "sincerity"
has been subject to quite divergent interpretations. The Selective
Service System has taken the position that "[the] belief upon
which conscientious objection is based must be the primary controlling factor in the man's life." 65 This interpretation appears to
be unduly restrictive, and not sanctioned by either the language of
section 6(j) or the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. What is
required is that the beliefs "impose upon [the registrant] a duty of
66
conscience to refrain from participation in any war at any time."
The proper inquiry for the local board is whether these beliefs are
67
"truly held."
To resolve this issue, the local boards must engage in a case by
case determination of a purely subjective fact. To assist in this
determination, the boards should adopt a balancing approach and
weigh all of the evidence.
In determining what factors the local board should consider,
the courts are frequently in hopeless conflict, and many undertake
a rather independent, almost de novo review of local board decisions. Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic change in the
willingness of the courts to review the sincerity issue in recent
years, with a much greater reluctance to accept superficial reasons
68
for a denial of a conscientious objector claim.
Some courts now hold that certain factors, standing alone, are
69
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of insincerity.
64348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955).
6 Local Board Memorandum No. 107 (1970).
6
6 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
67 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
68
See, e.g., Helwich v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1971), holding there must be
"hard, provable, reliable facts" in the record to support a finding of insincerity.
69
See, e.g., United States v. Abbott, 425 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1970) (lateness); United
States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1954) (failure to publicly express beliefs); and
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For example, a local board's mere disbelief of a registrant has
been an inappropriate basis for sustaining a finding of insincerity
since Witmer. However, the courts do not deal with the issue of
what weight should be given to particular factors, and one or two
minor factors have frequently been relied upon to sustain a finding
70
which is otherwise against the weight of the evidence.
Because of the nature of the issue, this section of the proposed
form requires a different approach than that used in the preceding
sections. A number of factors are set out as examples of what the
local board should consider in deciding the sincerity issue. Instead
of merely making a finding on the question, the form requires the
local board to set out all of the factors that bear upon the question
of sincerity. In this way the local board should be discouraged
from merely seeking out and concentrating on one or two minor
factors; if they omit consideration of any relevant factors, this will
also be clear. Although this procedure will not prevent the local
board from considering invalid factors, ignoring valid factors, or
drawing erroneous conclusions from all the relevant factors, it will
allow for a much easier review of board decisions by appeal
boards, administrative personnel, and courts. To the extent that
the board's errors are minor, courts can be expected to use the
71
harmless error rule to sustain the local board decision.
The enumerated criteria in this section are drawn largely from
the case law, with some common sense hopefully filling in gaps.
Although a single body of law seems to be emerging slowly from
the lower court cases, there are many conflicting decisions, and,
where this is so, what is believed to be the better rule has been
adopted.
Inconsistencies or conflicts that appear on the face of the
registrant's claim, insofar as they are relevant, seem to present the
clearest ground for a finding of insincerity, and the courts have so
held. 72 At the same time, these apparent inconsistencies can often
be explained, and therefore the board should bring them to the
attention of the registrant who appears personally before it.
The courts have long considered the demeanor and credibility
of the registrant as being indicative of his sincerity, 73 although the
United States v. Cummins, 425 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1970) (seeking deferments as well as
conscientious
objector status).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1960) (three separate cases,
all illustrate this point); and United States v. Kember, 437 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1970)
(lateness of claim, one of many people interviewed by board doubted sincerity, and
claimant may have told someone he was in college to avoid the draft).
71 See note 2 1 supra.
72

See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
73 Id.

WINTER 1972]

Conscientious Objector Claims

courts have begun to require the local board to detail adverse
findings in this area in the registrant's file. 74 Employment and
activity of the registrant also have long been recognized as important factors. There should be practical limits to the importance of
these factors, however. The fact that a registrant worked in a steel
mill whose product might eventually end up in a war machine has
been found to be irrelevant, 75 while recent uncomplaining participation in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) has been
76
held relevant to the sincerity question.
References, either through letters solicited by the registrant or
obtained by the board on its own initiative, can provide important
information on the sincerity issue. The cases, however, indicate a
lamentable practice on the part of some boards of searching
diligently for anyone who will comment adversely on the registrant's claim, and basing a finding of insincerity on that information. 77 This should be discouraged if the person giving the
information has only a passing acquaintance with the registrant.
Timing is another factor which local boards have relied upon
too heavily. Some courts have now held that lateness alone will
not support a finding of insincerity. 78 Others have held that lateness is totally irrelevant where the registrant has been in a deferred classification at all times prior to making his claim. 79 This
would appear to be the correct interpretation of the Selective
Service Regulations, since the claim, even if upheld, would not
80
change the registrant's classification.
The public expression of one's beliefs over a period of time
would seem to indicate that the registrant is sincere. Nevertheless, failure to give public expression to one's beliefs should
not alone support a finding of insincerity. 81 Another factor which
may be of great relevance in particular cases, but which is subject
to abuse, is the religious affiliation of the registrant. The Witmer
74 See, e.g., United States v. Deere, 428 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1970). Contra, United
States v. Blackwell, 310 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Me. 1970).
75 United States v. Joyce, 437 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1971).
76
United States v. Pritchard, 413 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1969).
77See, e.g., United States v. Leavy, 422 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1056 (1970).
78 United States ex. rel. Hemes v. McNulty, 432 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1970); Capiobianco v. Laird, 424 F.2d 1304 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Abbott, 425 F.2d 910 (8th
Cir. 1970).
79 United States v. Rutherford. 437 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Velen,
437 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1971).
8°"Each classified registrant shall within 10 days after it occurs, report to the local
board in writing any fact ... that might result in his being placed in a different
cassification." 32 C.F.R. § 1625.1(b) (1971). as amended, 36 Fed. Reg. 21077 (Nov. 3,

1971) (emphasis added).
81 One court has so held: United States v. Close, 215 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1959).
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opinion indicates that membership in a pacifist sect is relevant to
the board's inquiry, but that the real issue is the personal beliefs
of the registrant.8 2 Thus, although one court has held that a
Menonite's violation of the tenets of his faith by drinking and
dating girls was a sufficient basis to find that he did not sincerely
hold the pacifist beliefs of the sect,8 3 the better rule seems to be
that the registrant is in no way bound to all of the beliefs of his
sect.8 4 It is also quite clear from the broad definition of religious
training and belief that the fact that the registrant does not belong
to any sect is not conclusive.
While a sudden change of behavior may indicate insincerity, it
may also buttress the argument of one who claims a recent conversion. Finally, crimes of physical violence should cast doubts
upon a registrant's sincerity, but other types of crimes should be
85
irrelevant.
The personal knowledge of the board members must be included if the "little groups of neighbors" fantasy is to survive at
all. However, any information so relied upon must be placed in
the registrant's file so that he will have an opportunity to examine
and rebut it.86
The factors included in this section may appear rather obvious.
The object of listing them, however, is to force the local board to
consider each claim fully, and not to concentrate upon only one or
two factors. In an effort to avoid limiting the scope of the board's
inquiry, it is specifically provided that other factors may be considered.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Use of the proposed form in local board consideration of conscientious objector claims would provide a framework for reasoned application of the standards which have been established by
the courts. As a result, registrants claiming conscientious objector
status would be ensured of a more uniform application of the
standards. Moreover, the number of court appeals arising from
misapplication of the standards would be lessened and, in those
instances where an appeal did arise, the courts would be in a
82

See also Olquin v. United States, 392 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1968).

United States v. Penner, 420 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1970), vacated on confession of
error by Solicitor General, 399 U.S. 522 (1970).
8Cf.
United States v. Newton, 435 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1970) (Seventh Day Adventist
83

not barred from conscientious objector status because members of his sect generally object
only to combatant service).
5Chernekoff
8632C.F.R.

§

v. United States, 219 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1955).
1623.1 (1971), as amended, 36 Fed. Reg. 21076 (Nov. 3, 1971).
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better position to review the local board decision. Use of the
proposed form would thus benefit all parties involved while compromising the interests of none.
The type of procedure suggested here should be used, not only
in conscientious objector claims, but in other areas where the
local boards must apply extremely technical standards. The only
way to guarantee that such standards are correctly applied is to
ensure that an adequate explanation of them is before the board
each time the problem arises. The proposed form would be an
important step in that direction.
Perhaps the form proposed in this article establishes a framework too rigid and technical to be applied effectively by the local
boards. Perhaps local board members are not sophisticated
enough to use it properly. If so, considering the truly elementary
nature of the proposal, the local boards have lost any claim to
being effective administrative agencies and a more elaborate
structural reform must be implemented.
On the other hand, perhaps the proposal is simply unneeded.
Perhaps the local boards can handle the disposition of conscientious objector claims without the suggested form. But this
position is belied by their past performance, as evidenced in
nearly every volume of the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement.
-David M. FitzGerald*
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